Producers Livestock Marketing Association v. Zane Christensen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Producers Livestock Marketing Association v. Zane
Christensen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ben E. Rawlings; James R. Morgan; Attorneys for Respondent;
R. Earl Dillman; Brant H. Wall; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n v. Christensen, No. 15388 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/819
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----------------
PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK MARKETING * 
ASSOCIATION, A Utah Cooperative 
Association, * 
Plaintiff-Respondent. * 
vs. 
* 
ZANE CHRISTENSEN, * 
Defendant-Appellant. * 
CASE NO. 15388 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY 
HONORABLE J. DUFFY PALMER, JUDGE 
BEN E. RAWLINGS 
JAMES R. MORGAN 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
R. EARL DILLMAN 
BRANT H. WALL 
Suite 500 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK ~ARKETING * 
ASSOCIATION, A Utah Cooperative 
Association, * 
Plaintiff-Respondent. * 
vs. 
* 
ZANE CHRISTENSEN, * 
Defendant-Appellant. '' 
CASE NO. 15388 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY 
HONORABLE J. DUFFY PALMER, JUDGE 
BEN E. RAHLI:-IGS 
JAMES R. MORGAN 
1300 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
R. EARL DILLMAN 
BRANT H. WALL 
Suite 500 Judge Building 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Attornevs for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
P'\ELll1INARY STATEMENT -
~ATURE OF THE CASE- -
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT- -
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -
STATEHENT OF FACTS-
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL ATTENDANT CIR-
CUMSTANCES AND COUNTERVAILING TES-
TIMONY, THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT ARE SO CLEARLY AND PALPABLY 
UNREASONABLE THAT NO FACT TRIER 
ACTING FAIRLY AND REASONABLY COULD 
ACCEPT SAME, AND SAID FINDINGS 
SHOULD BE REJECTED AS A MATTER OF 
LAW AND THE FACTS DETERMINED 
OTHERWISE. - - - - - - - - - - - -
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THE WITNESS, J.L. LINDSAY, TO BE 
ADVERSE TO THE PLAINTIFF AND THUS 
FAILED TO GIVE PROPER \-lEIGHT TO 
HIS TESTIMONY. - - - - -
CONCLUSION- - - - - - - -
CASES CITED 
Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 
P2d 35 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Stewart, 
" C2d 228, 291 P2d 890- - - - - - - - - - -
~ouglas Reservoir's Water User's Assoc., v. 
Cos s , 56 9 P 2 d, 12 8 0- - - - - - - - -
:!ehbrandt v. Hall, 213 P2d 605 (Colo. 1950) 
?rosser c. Schmidt, 262 P2d 2 72 -
i 
Page 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
8 
22 
23 
8 
12' 13 
8 
22 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pyle v. Phillips, 164 SW 2d 569 - - - - - -
Stevens v. Gray, 123 Utah 395, 259 P2d 889-
Suddeth v. Commonwealth Countv Insurance 
Company, 454 SW 2d 196- - ·- - - -
Thurlow v. United States, 295 Federal 905 -
United States v. Marine Ban-Corporation Inc., 
(1974) 418 U.S. 602, 41 L ed 2d 978, 945 ST 
2856- - - - - - - - - -
West v. West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P2d 22- -
RULES OF PROCEDURE 
Rule 52 (a) U.R.C.P.- - - - - - - - - - - -
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES 
3 C.J.S., Agency- - - - - - - -
32 A C.J.S., Evidence -
Page, Treatise on Contracts 
ii 
22 
8 
22 
22 
21 
8 
20 
21 
22 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPRE~lli COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
PRODUCERS LIVESTOCK MARKETING * 
ASSOCIATION, A Utah Cooperative 
Association, * 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 7< 
vs. 
ZANE CHRISTENSEN, * 
Defendant-Appellant. 'i< 
CASE NO. 15388 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the trial court. 
"R" refers to record and "TR" refers to transcript of record. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, Producer's Livestock Marketing Association, 
filed a Complaint in two counts. The first count seeks to recover 
$23,667.20 and the second count seeks to recover $25,567.66 which 
sums lvere obtained by defendant by drawing drafts upon the 
Jlaintiff. The defendant answered, admitting that he had received 
said sums of money, hm·rever, by way of counterclaim, he alleges 
:n five counts that the plaintiff had conducted a course of 
business with him for many vears, involving the purchase, sale 
and feeding of cattle; that denand was made upon plaintiff for 
an accounting and judgment against plaintiff for the various sums 
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set forth in each count, less cred;t for th · ~ e sums rece~ved bv :< 
drafts (R 6-10). At the beginning of the trial, the court gran:e: 
leave to amend count I of the counterclaim to show the sum of 
$105,625.62 as the amount due defendant (TR 7). 
DISPOSITION IN LOHER COURT 
The case was tried to the court sitting without a jurv, 
the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, presiding. At the conclusion of 
the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the olaintE: 
on each count of the Complaint, and awarded judgment of $23,66i. 
together with interest at the legal rate on count I, and the 
sum of $26,567.66 together with interest at the legal rate on 
count II. 
\.Jith respect to the Counterclaim of the defendant, the co;: 
denied recovery on all counts except as to count V, upon which 
he granted judgment in favor of defendant for the sum of $4,000.· 
together with interest (TR 315-318). Thereafter, defendant ':ilec 
objections to Findings of Fact, Cone 1 us ions of Law and Judg:nen: 
and Motion to Amend same, and also filed a "lotion for New Trial 
(R 64-67). After hearing, the court denied the "lotion for New 
Trial and modified paragraph !frS of the Findings of Fact (R 73-7-
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant appeals from the judgment of the :rial cour: 
except as to count V of the Counterclaim. and further apoeals 
from the judgment and Order of the court denving the ~lotion fo: 
a New Trial and >!otion to Amend Findings oF Fact, Conclusions 2 : 
~ J ~ ~ k "' r'-_ ;s cour':: order ..:·1d:o:nen-: ~:'. c,-Law an'-' uc.gcner. t, an c. as s : .. a':: ~-~~ ., 
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Jf defendant on all counts and reverse the judgments in favor 
of plaintiff, or in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Zane Christensen, resides at Talmage, Utah 
in Duchesne County, and for many years has been engaged in 
ranching and buying and selling cattle (TR 26-27). In the year 
1948, he began dealing with the plaintiff by purchasing cattle 
for resale based upon their solicitation (TR 39, 40, 122). This 
relationship grew and expanded during the years until about 1954 
at which time the relationship had developed to the point where 
:he defendant would purchase cattle and the plaintiff would sell 
:hem and the "profits" would be "split" (TR 40). In about 1954 
the plaintiff gave the defendant a draft book to use for financing 
the purchase of cattle and told him to use it to make money for 
both of them (TR 40) 0 From that date on, the defendant, with the 
consent, knowledge and concurrence of Jo Lo Lindsay, who was 
the employee, agent and division manager of the plaintiff, 
conducted a course of business involving the purchase, sale, 
feeding and care of thousands of cattle and involving millions of 
dollars (TR 29, 41, 124, 149, 166, 16 7, 226, 229) 0 In nearly all 
~nscances, the parties "split" the profit or loss after jointly 
Javing the costs involved in feeding and shipping (TR 92, 99, 126, 
~~l-143, 156, 172) 0 
\vith respect to count I of the defendant's Counterclaim, 
i:J September, 1973, at the request of the plaintiff, the 
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defendant appeared at a public auction involving the sale of 
approximately 2280 calves belonging to the Ute Indian Tribe, 
the defendant having purchased calves from the Ute Tribe in 
previous years for himself and the plaintiff for resale (TR 
50-51). The defendant was instructed by J. L. Lindsay, division 
manager for plaintiff, to purchase the calves based upon his 
own judgment, (TR 52, 127) and that the plaintiff was sending 
a purchaser by the name of Carl Short to sit in on the auction 
who wanted to buy most of the calves. The defendant was the 
successful bidder at the sale and purchased 2282 calves for a 
total of $611,605.38 and issued a draft on plaintiff in payment 
therefor :TR 52). 
By mutual agreement between the defendant and J. L. Lindso 
as division manager for plain tiff, 994 of the calves were sold 
to Waitt Cattle Company at a price of $237,429.05 and the rernai~.: 
1288 calves were left in possession of the defendant due to the 
fact that Carl Short was unable to obtain funds with which to 
purchase same (TR 54). At that point in time, the price of care:, 
was declining and by mutual agreement, Lindsay and Christensen 
agreed that the calves would be placed in a feed lot until the 
following spring, at which time the parties hoped thev could se: 
and recover their money (TR 54, 112, 113, 129, 130) . 
The market continued a drastic decline and in the fall.:' 
1973 the parties worked out a plan and agreement wherebY all o: 
the calves, except 86 head which could not be accommodated in:' 
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feed lot, would be delivered to Max Johnson and Bert Johnson at 
Delta, Utah, who conducted a feed lot operation. (TR 54, 129, 
130). The agreement provided that the Johnsons would pay $250.00 
per head for the calves, feed them during the winter and then 
resell them to the parties the following spring on the basis of 
$250.00 per head plus 42¢ per pound for weight increase (TR 54-56, 
61-62) (Ex. "P"). 
The Johnsons paid $283,500.00 upon delivery of the calves 
which sums the defendant paid over to plaintiff (TR 56). There-
after, at the request of plaintiff's division manager, J.L. Lindsay, 
the defendant paid by personal check the sum of $90,676.33 to the 
plaintiff to alleviate a financial problem then being experienced 
by plaintiff, upon the representation by Lindsay that a later 
accounting would be made to adjust the sum paid (TR 56, 65, 115, 
116, 117, 155). 
Of the total calves delivered to Bert Johnson (568) there 
was a buy back of 322 steers for $102,900.00 plus a payment of 
$11,946.18 for feeding 238 heifers or a total of $114,886.18. 
$83,336.08 of said total sum was paid by drafts drawn on plaintiff 
and the balance of $31,550.10 was paid by defendant's personal 
check. (TR 57-58) (Ex. 4). 
I.Jith regard to the 634 calves delivered to :.lax Johnson, 
che parties and Johnson mutually agreed that instead of re-
~urchasing the calves per prior agreement, they would settle with 
Johnson bv allowing him to retain the calves and the plaintiff 
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and defendant would pay the feed bill, which was negotiated at 
$75,000.00 and was paid by the defendant from his personal 
account (TR 60-61) (Ex. 1 & 2). 
The 322 steers which were re-purchased from Bert Johnson 
were returned to the defendant's ranch in Duchesne County, and 
placed with the 86 head which defendant had to keep and feed on 
his ranch during the winter months (TR 61-62) due to the fact 
that the Johnsons did not have room for them (TR 61-62). In 
October 1974, the plaintiff sold the 408 head of cattle for a 
total of $89,591.05, however, after pavment of shipping and 
freight charges of $4,956.71, the net recovery on the 408 head 
was $84,634.34. Plaintiff then issued a check to defendant 
whereby $83,815.80 was paid to defendant on the "Indian calves" 
the plaintiff retaining $818.54 (TR 63-65) (Ex. 4). 
The defendant fed the 408 head of cattle for several 
months prior to sale and incurred feeding costs of $10,740.00 
(TR 6 7) 
In summary, the to tal transaci ton invo 1 vini' the 2282 heac 
of calves pruchased from the llte Indian Tribe resulted in a ne: 
loss of $209,614.17 which has been borne solelv bv the defend~: 
and according to de fen dan t, the ? lain tiff should re snond for or.e· 
half of said loss. (TR. 56, 71-72, 99, 133, 134, 1.53, 165) rEx· 
In regard to Count II of the Counterclaim, t':1e relevan: 
facts are that in Februarv ~q-4 the defendant, oursuanc tO ir-.-
structions and agreement with ?laint~f~. ne?otiated t~e 
of 772 head of cat:le for 5297,565.00 ar1d incurred shiooin£ ~cs: 
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of $2,038.00 for a total obligation of $299,603.00 (TR 72-73). 
These cattle were thereafter sold for $325,786.14 which resulted 
in a net gain of $26,183.14 (TR 72-73) (Ex 5). The plaintiff paid 
defendant $4,600.00 leaving a balance of $8,491.57 as his share 
of the profits unpaid (TR 74-74). This transactio~ as in manv 
similar transactions, was to be handled as a partnership "50/50" 
deal (TR 71) . 
The relavant facts pertaining to Count III of the Counter-
claim are essentiallv as follows: 
In about November, 1973, J.L. Lindsay, district manager for 
plaintiff, requested defendant to negotiate the sale of 254 head 
of cattle and the parties agreed to "split the profits, 50/ SO" 
(TR 76). The sale produced a profit or gain of $4,900.92 and 
plaintiff paid defendant $2,000.00, leaving a balance of $450.46 
unpaid (TR 77) (Ex 6). 
Count IV of the Counterclaim involved a transaction lvith 
parties generally referred to as "M N U". In the fall of 1q70 the 
plaintiff and defendant had purchased cattle for "l< !l U" and 
shipped them to Nevada. The defendant had paid $960.00 for frei~ht 
~hich was to be repaid when the transaction was concluded and the 
profit was to be divided eauallv. The sale failed due to a death of 
one of the purchasers and bv ne~otiation the cattle were resold 
and $6,000.00 was paid to plaintiff, no part of which was paid to 
sefendant (TR 81) (Ex 7). 
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In the spring of 1975, the defendant made demand upon the 
plaintiff for a total accounting, which was refused, and hence 
this litigation (TR 69). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL ATTENDANT CIRCU}'fSTANCES AND COUNTER-
VAILING TESTIMONY, THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SO CLEARL' 
AND PALPABLY UNREASONABLE THAT NO FACT TRIER ACTING FAIRLY A~D 
REASONABLY COULD ACCEPT SA11E, AND SAID "FINDINGS SHOULD BE REJECC: 
AS A M~TTER OF LAH AND THE FACTS DETE~!INED OTHERIHSE. 
He are not unmindful of the long line of cases propounded 
by this court which stand for the proposition that the trial coT 
findings will not be disturbed if based upon sufficient and prooe: 
evidence, the cases be in['; so numerous and well documented as to 
require no citation here. However, the subject action, in our 
opinion, falls within that line of cases which recognizes the ri;· 
of this court to review the evidence, testimonv, and record, a~ 
reach it's own independent conclusion from the evidence therein 
contained. 
This case involves an accounting, and as such it invokes· 
power of this court to review questions of both law and fact. 
po· (Douglas Reservoir's ~-later rser' s Association v. Cross, 569 cc 
1280; Stevens v. Grav, 123 Utah 395, 259 P2d 889; \Jest v. 'ies: 
16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P2d 22; Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 3' 
465 P2d 357. 
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In the West case, this court stated: 
"Inasmuch as this is a suit over an accounting 
in a partnership, it is a suit in equitv and 
it is the responsibilitY of this court to 
review questions of both law and fact." 
The major problem with the facts found bv the trial 
court is that they find no support by the overwhelming evidence 
and testimony, and are in many instances in direct conflict with 
unrefuted, substantial and probative testimony and evidence. 
A review of the critical testimony becomes necessary to 
bring into focus the error committed by the court. 
It is undisputed that the plaintiff and defendant began 
dealing with each other in numerous and varied business trans-
actions involving the sale, purchase and feeding of cattle as 
early as 1948, (TR 39, 123) and continued until the date that an 
accounting was demanded by the dfendant in the spring of 1975. 
(TR 123,124, 144). 
During this ~xtensive period of time the plaintiff relied 
entirelv upon their agent, employee and district manager, J.L. 
Lindsav, to work out the details of each transaction and conclude 
the negotiations on whatever bas is he saw fit. (TR 123, 128, 148. 
149, 226, 229). 
The trial court in it's ruling made the following comments: 
"As to what has been designated as the Ute transaction, 
there is no auestion in the court's mind that there 
has been a m~thod of dealing between the parties, 
perhaps contrarv to the regulations of_the govern-
mental agencies involved, where both ot them are 
licenced dealers, both of them knew thev should not 
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have been in a partnership relationship, each of 
them_kn7w thev should not have been issuing split 
comm~ss~ons to one another and vet these trans-
actions persisted. It's not hard to find the 
partnership transactions .... " 
" .... I find that the partnership did exist; .... " (TR 317) 
The trial court having found and concluded that a partne:-
ship existed, it logicallv follows that the issue of whether or 
not an accounting was ever accomplished becomes pivitol in this 
case. A review of the pertinent testimony and evidence conclusLe 
shows that at no time did defendant ever acknowledge or conclude 
a settlement and the testimony of plaintiff's 01-m district manage: 
J. L. Lindsay, corroborates this fact (TR 99, 100, 102, 107, 112 
113' 115' 116' 117) . 
The relationship involved thousands of transactions and 
millions of dollars and during this time the defendant was a 
trusted associate and made the plaintiff a great deal of monev 
(TR40,4l, 123,124,166, 167). On some occasions, theoarties 
had experienced losses and shared same on an approximatelY "50/i: 
basis (TR 133, 200, 231, 283). 
Generally speaking, the losses were carried over for a 
period of time and worked out in later dealings (TR 133, 162, 
The arrangements tvere verv informal and LindsaY made the u1ti:Ja:. 
decisions as to when and how the payments •vere made for settlece· 
of the various deals (TR 126, 129, 229, 2311. The record disc::s 
that LindsaY was given a free hand ~Y the plaintiff to deal 
Christensen on anY basis he t:.J,ought a:Jpropriate (':''\ 1.23, 126, 
129, 133, 134, 148, 149, 162, 164, 226-231). Hohreve:r, :i..: ~v·as ~.:· 
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until the substantial loss occurred in 1973-1974, involving the 
"Indian calves" that the plaintiff tried to disavow anv authority 
on the part of Lindsay, and attempted to disclaim any duty toward 
the defendant. T·Te find it of interest, and difficult to understand, 
why and how the trial court, having found a partnership to exist, 
has seen fit to ignore the testimony of the defendant and that 
of the plaintiff's district manager, in concluding :hat a partner-
ship settlement had been achieved when both Lindsav and Christensen 
have directly and unequivocally testified to the contrary. The 
onlv possible evidence which would give rise to such a conclusion or 
inference are the"deal sheets", which are, J.t best, self-serving 
documents prepared solely under the supervision of the accounting 
personnel of the plaintiff and lacking in proper foundation, plus 
the hearsay testimony of the general manager as to what he concluded 
from a discussion between himself and Lindsay. For the trial court 
to reach such a conclusion it had to ignore the only probative, 
direct and undisputed oral testimony given on the subject. It is 
:rue that certain inconsistent testimony, if believed, was illicited 
on rebuttal to impeach some aspects of the testimony of Lindsav. 
H01vever, this testimony was admitted in evidence for "impeachment 
:Jurposes onlv" and cannot form the basis of such a findinv. (TR 205-
207) See AmJur 421 Sec. 770; 20 AmJur 404, Sec. 458. This would 
a:: best leave the undisputed testimonY of the defendant himself, who 
:estified that no fina~ settlement r.vas ever attained, and the 
:-ecord ~s ::e;Jle:e ·.vi:h such testimonv. (TR 43, 56, 68, 69, 99, 100) 
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Also, the court seemed to get carried away with the idea 
that the plaintiff had no way of protecting itself from the 
machinations of it's own district manager, and for some reason, 
which we fail to understand, takes this as a further unwarrantec 
basis for it's ruling (TR 317). The testimony of the plaintiff's 
general manager stands undisputed that Lindsay was given full 
authority to manage his books and affairs (TR 226-229). 
In the case of Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Stewa:· 
4 U2d 228, 291 P2d 890, the court was confronted with the pr~l~, 
of giving weight to the testimony of a key witness who had an 
obvious financial interest in the outcome of the li tiP: a tion anc 
in oassin~ uoon this issue, the court stated: 
"1-Jhile it is true that the testimony of a 
witness such as Mr. Cheney would ordinarily 
be regarded as sufficient to compel the affir-
mance of the trial court's finding, that is not 
necessarily so under all circumstances. Defen-
dant is correct in arguing that even though 
the testimony standing alone might be sufficient 
to support a finding, it must always be appraised 
in the light of all the attendant circumstances 
and countervailing testimonv. If when so viewed 
it a ears so clearlY and al ably unreasonable 
act trier actin airlv and reasonablY 
is particularlv so here where Mr. 
CheneY had such a vital personal interest in 
the controversv, since it obviouslv would be 
greatly to his. advantage if he could fix 'J.pon 
Mr. Stewart the responsibilitY of paving this 
large unsecured personal debt." (Emphasis added) 
It is obvious from the ruling of :he trial court that ,:, 
net result is to saddle the defendant with the horrendous burc,· 
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of singularly sustaining a loss of approximately $210,000 on the 
transaction involving the "Indian calves". ',Je cannot find suffi-
cient basis in testimony or evidence which warrants such a drastic 
result. 
In the case of Continental Bank & Trust Company v. Stewart, 
supra., this court, discussing a concept of law dealing with 
contracts between parties, cites Page, Treatise On Contracts, as 
follows: 
"As between two constructions, each probable, 
one of which makes the contract fair and 
reasonable and the other of which makes it 
unfair and unreasonable, the former should 
always be preferred." 
Although this case was dealing with a principal of interpreting 
contract law where an uncertainty exists, it nevertheless carries 
with it an equitable principle we believe apropos in the instant 
case. To allow the ruling of the trial court to stand, in effect 
gives greater credibility to that construction which smacks of 
gross unfairness and unreasonableness, considering some 25 years 
of dealings between the parties where the plaintiff has eaten the 
fruit of profit and now refuses to bear a oortion of the losses 
on a pick and choose basis. 
With regard to the Findings of Fact adopted bv the trial 
court, no issue ever existed '"ith respect to the two sums of 
~oney received by the defendant by virtue of drafts which he drew 
upon the plaintiff in the amount of $23,667.20 and $26,567.66 
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as set forth in Findings #3 and 4, and it was conceded that thes, 
amounts would constitute a credit to plaintiff in the final 
accounting sought by defendant (TR 9, 10, 15). 
Finding of Fact lfoS recites that defendant purchased live· 
stock from the planitiff. This Finding is not supported by any 
testimony or evidence and is typical of many such erroneous 
findings. 
That portion of Finding lfo6 relative to the witness Lindsa: 
being adverse to the plaintiff is consistent with the ruling oi 
the court (TR 317) but totally lacking in substance. A total 
reading of the record shmvs that this witness gave testimonv, 
favorable and unfavorable, to both parties. 
It seems the only reason the court came to such a conclu· 
sian was the fact that the testimony of this witness did not 
support or square with the court's ruling. The mere fact that a 
witness testifies truthfully under oath should not, per se, make 
him an "adverse witness". Such a finding is not supported by the 
record and was in error. 
The record does not support that portion of Finding i/7 
which recites that "when a partnership deal was completed, the 
defendant personally and the plaintiff through it's then agent 
and employee, J.L. Lindsay, would have a partnershiP accountin' 
The record contains extensive ces timonv re la ti ve to the 
fact that accountings were frequentlv discussed and freauentl·· 
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postponed or ignored. (TR 56, 68, 69, 88, 93, 95, 96, 99, 100, 
117, 120, 133, 135, 136, 137, 156, 157, 158, 163, 164). The 
testimony indicates that neither Christensen or Lindsay were too 
concerned with an exact date for accounting, and as testified 
by Lindsay, "as long as Chris tens en wasn't squealing too loud" 
the bad deals were ignored and settlement deferred to a later 
date (TR 162-164). This testimony is further supported by that of 
the general manager, Joe Jacobs, when he testified that Lindsay 
was given full discretion in how he handled his books and how 
Christensen was treated (TR 229). 
Finding #8 is not consistent with the overwhelming evidence. 
Finding #9 recites in part that Lindsay, plaintiff's agent, 
and the defendant, agreed on the price to be paid for the Indian 
calves, which are the subject of the first count of defendant's 
counterclaim. How this finding can be sustained defies the 
imagination in light of the testimony illicited on the subject. 
At pages 127 & 128 of the transcript of record appears the follow-
ing testimony of J. L. Lindsay, plaintiff's agent: 
"'Q. Did you discuss with Mr. Christensen the amount that 
should be paid for these Indian cattle? 
A. Yes, I think we did talk in general figures. 
Q. And was the matter left to his final dis ere tion as to 
~hether or not he purchased them or bid them out? I understand 
i.t '•as an auction sale. 
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"A. Yes, we have always had it that wav. 
Q. All right. What happened after the sale, do vou rec;_ 
A. Yes. He called me up and told me what he had given fc: 
them and I about dropped over dead. And I said, well, I guess '1: 
was there and if that's what you had to do, that's the way it :; 
The testimony of Christensen is essentially the same. At 
pages 51-52 of the Transcript of Record appears the following: 
"Q. It was an auction. Had vou received any instructions 
from Producer's Livestock as to that particular transaction? 
A. I talked to J.L. about it. He said go there at the 
auction and try to buy the calves. He said, we will have a man 
there by the name of Carl Short that wants the big end of the 
calves and he will sit with you. 
Q. And were you given anv instructions as to how much 
you should pay for them? 
A. No. 
Q. \-Jhat, if anything, was said about that? 
A. He said, use your own judgment." 
The evidence does not support a finding that defendant):. 
in excess of the "agreed" upon bid price. Lindsay and Chris tense: 
were the only witnesses who testified regarding this matter. 
(TR 51, 52, 127, 128) 
That portion of the same finding which states that Chris: 
"personallv contracted" with the Johnsons is likewise lackinz :: 
support and in direct conflict with the onlv probative testi:no: 
the matter At pages 54 & 55 of the transcritJt of record aooea:' 
the following testimonv of Christensen: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-17-
11
n. And did you have anv discussion with ~r. Lindsav as 
to what disposition should be made of the calves that vou still 
~ad? 
A. We, we talked about it several times. 
~- And was there anYthing afreed upon? 
A. We finally agreed that if we could find a place to 
~ut them and feed them, possibly in the spring we could get out 
on the calves and maybe get our money back out of them. 
Q. And pursuant to that, what happened? 
A. The market just kept going down, down, and but in the 
meantime, we made a deal with the Johnsons in Delta to feed the 
calves." 
Christensen further testified: (TR 112) 
Q. Who made the deal to sell the cattle to the 
Johnson Brothers? 
A. They came up to see me and I talked with them. TheY 
:old what thev could do. I called J.L. LindsaY and told him. You 
see, what do you think, and he said, I think we ought to trv it. 
The testimony of J.L. LindsaY appearing at pages 129-130 
of the transcript of record is also significant: 
"A. \Jell, Peter had, Mr. Waitt had a place to go with some 
Jf the calves down into Texas where he had some cheap feed and he 
said that he would take some of the calves and, I can't tell YOU 
-~e exact time, but Zane rinallv said that he could tell, he could 
send :'le 2a~·:es down :a :'le Johnsons and if we buv the ca:::I.e back 
~~ :~e scring, he said he could probablv make the thing wash out 
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so that it isn't a severe loss. 
Q. Did you know the Johnsons? 
A. Oh yes. 
Q. Had you dealt with them prior to that time in the feec 
lot operation? 
A. Many times. 
Q. So that you knew who he was sending the cattle to? 
A. I introduced him to Mr. Johnson. 
Q. And you then concurred with his evaluation as to what 
should be done with the cattle? 
A. That was about the only alternative we had. 
Q. But at anv rate, they were sent down to Johnsons to ce 
fed until spring; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you recall the amount that Johnsons were to pav a: 
the time they took the cattle and then you say to be repurchasec 
in the spring? 
A. No, I don't recall the exact figures. 
Q. But you did concur with this arrangement? 
A. Yes." 
In 1 igh t of this undisputed tes timonv, it is obvious tha: 
the arrangement with Johnsons for the feeding of the calves was 
jointly initiated and agreed to by both parties. 
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The final portion of said finding which is in direct con-
flict with the testimony is that portion which recites that the 
defendant "reimbursed plaintiff" for the $90,676.33. Both Christen-
sen and Lindsay testified that the money was paid by Christensen to 
alleviate a financial problem on the part of the plaintiff and that 
the matter would be adjusted later. Christensen testified as follows: 
"Q. So what we have is that the Johnson Brothers pay off 
approximately 275 -- $280,000 towards the purchase price of those 
cattle, and there's the $90,000 that's left over. Now what happens 
with respect to that $90,000? 
A. J.L. came to me and said that they had a tremedous loss, 
Producers, had a tremendous loss, and was there any way that I 
could let them have that money until they could get things recou-
perated and gathered together again"(TR 115). * * * 
"Q. J.L. Lindsay said he needed the money. Did he indicate 
to you that there was pressure for him to clean off the accounts 
receivable? 
A. No. 
Q. He indicated that he did need the money. What did you say? 
A. He said he needed the money. J.L. said that he needed 
the money and that 1ve would straighten up at a later time" (TR 116, 
ll7) . 
Lindsay, testifying relative to the pavment of the $90,676.33 
clearly indicated that he \vas interested in getting the account 
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straightened up in connection with the "buv back" arrangement 
and that he realized there '"ould have to be a settlement "sooner 
or later" (TR 156-157). He further testified the he, Lindsay, 
wanted to get the money because the plaintiff was short of funds 
and "plaintiff was participating in the buy back just like Mr. 
Christensen was" (TR 155). 
The most gross missapplication of the testimony and evidenc, 
is found in Finding 4,110. With the exception of the first sentence 
the remainder of the finding is totallv inconsistent with the 
credible evidence and testimony. At no time did either the defen· · 
dant or Lindsay, plaintiff's agent, testify that the partnershi?, 
had been finalized or that a final accounting: attained, but to 
the contrary, each party testified that an accounting was to be 
had and that the defendant was entitled to such (TR 43, 56, 99, 
100, 133, 134, 135, 136, 156-158, 162-164). The general manager 
for plaintiff, Joe Jacobs, failed to refute or deny the testimon· 
of Christensen found on page 43 of the transcript of record l<hW 
Christensen testified that Jacobs acknowledged an accounting 
should be had. 
All of the Findings are fraught with the same errors as 
referred to hereinabove and the judgment based thereon should 
not be allowed to stand. 
Rule 52 (a) U.R.C.P. provides that the court shall fi:cd 
the facts speciallv and state separatelv it's conclusions oft;· 
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thereon. The Findings adopted by the court were prepared by counsel 
for plaintiff and a reading shows that it was not a disinterested 
mind which prepared the Findings. 
It has long been a trend in the courts to view with disfavor 
the Findings prepared and adopted verbatim by one side, and as the 
Supreme Court of the United States observed in the case of United 
States v. Marine Ban-Corporation. Inc., (1974) 418 U.S. 602, 41 
Led 2d 978, 945 ST 2856, at footnote 13: 
"In adopting verbatim proposed Findings of Fact in a 
complicated Section 7 antitrust action, the District 
Court failed to heed this Court's admonition voiced 
a decade ago." (Citing United States v. El Paso 
Natural Gas, op. cite.) 
The Findings of Fact conclusively establish J .L. Lindsay 
as the agent of the plaintiff, until July, 1975 (R 55), and 
having so found, the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to 
prove that they were not bound by his conduct and knowledge. 
(3 C.J.S., Agency, p. 295). 
At page 317 of the transcript of record, the court stated 
in it's oral ruling "that the subsequent transaction (March 1974) 
\o~as carried out without knowledge or consent and without the 
giving of any notice to or any ability on the part of the plaintiff 
to protect himself because they didn't know about the transaction 
until sometime in Mav or June (1975),"'"''" 
Viewed in this light, we are of the opinion that under the 
facts and circumstances, as supported by the record, the trial 
~ourt misconceived the law concluding in effect, that the plaintiff 
•.o~as not bound bv it's agent's actions and knowledge, which 
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constitutes reversable error. (Mehbrandt v. Hall, 213 P2d 605 
(Colo. 1950); Prosser v. Schmidt, 262 P2d 272. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE WITNESS J. L. LINDS~.': 
TO BE ADVERSE TO TI!f PLANITIFF AND THUS FAILED TO GIVE PROPER 
WEIGHT TO HIS TESTIMONY 
The court's ruling that the witness J.L. Lindsay was 
"adverse to the plain tiff" is without merit. The only bas is for 
such a conclusion seems to be the fact that Lindsav' s testimonv 
was not favorable to the plaintiff's contentions. 
There was no evidence to show that this witness had anv 
interest in the outcome of the lawsuit or that he harbored any 
animosity toward either party. Generally speaking, the absence 
of any bias operates in favor of the witness (Thurlow v. United 
States, 295 Federal 905; Suddeth v. Commonwealth Countv Insurance 
Company, 454 SW 2d 196; 32 A C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 1037 (d), 
p. 727). 
It has been recognized and held that where a former 
employee is called as a witness, he is considered a disinteres:e: 
witness, absent any showing of bias, etc. (Pvle v. Phillips, 
164 sw 2d 569). 
The ruling of the trial court that Lindsav \vas an adve~se 
witness to planitiff is not supported bv the record. 
In 32 A C.J.S., Evidence, page 69;-698 :he genera: -·J~ 2 
is stated 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-23-
" ... The testimony of a partv to a case or other 
interested witness, sho~ld not be disregarded 
or considered inherently improbable in the 
absence of conflicting proof or circumstances justifying doubt as to it's truth ... " 
CONCLUSION 
The only evidence and testimony offered by the plaintiff 
which would tend to support the critical findings of the trial 
court were "deal sheets" prepared by the plaintiff, '"hich, at 
best, were self-serving documents, lacking in foundation and 
substance. 
The testimony received in variance with that of the witness 
J. L. Lindsay was for "impeachment purposes only" and as such is 
totally improper as a basis for sustaining any Finding of Fact 
or Judgment. 
\{hen the total evidence and testimony is weighed in the 
light of all circumstances, it appears obvious that the defendant 
should prevail, and that the lower court committed reversable error. 
Respecfully submitted, 
R. EARL DILLMAN 
BRANT H. WALL 
Attornevs for Appellant 
Suite 500 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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